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Liapis v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (August 9, 2012)1
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY— CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
FAMILY LAW - DIVORCE
Summary
An interlocutory writ of mandamus from a district court order disqualifying an attorney
from representing his father in his parents’ divorce case.
Disposition/Outcome
An attorney can represent one of his or her parents in his parents’ divorce proceeding and
is not automatically disqualified for doing so. Such representation does not violate the
appearance of impropriety rule because no such rule exists in Nevada. A moving party also lacks
standing to bring such a suit if the attorney is not the moving party’s attorney, unless he or she
can establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Such a relationship in not presumed and
must be established as a matter of fact. Finally, disqualification is not appropriate during the
pretrial phase of the proceedings if the attorney is a potential witness.

Factual and Procedural History
Real party in interest, Marie Liapis, filed a Complaint for Divorce. Theodore Liapis filed
an Answer in proper person but later retained the couple’s son, Mark Liapis, as his attorney.
Marie filed a Motion to Disqualify Mark as Theodore’s attorney. She stated three grounds for
dismissal: (1) Mark’s representation of Thedore and his pecuniary interest created the appearance
of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented Marie, there was an inherent
conflict of interest because Mark could not zealously represent Theodore as Mark still professed
his love for both his parents; (3) Mark was a potential witness in the case.
Theodore responded that Marie’s boilerplate objections were insufficient to require
Mark’s disqualification and that Mark had no pecuniary interest in the estate. Theodore further
argued that no conflict of interest existed as Mark had never represented Marie, and Theodore
had waived any issue of conflict through informed consent. Finally, Theodore argued that
Nevada law allows for potential witnesses to serve as counsel during the pretrial phase of the
proceedings.2
The district court acknowledged the question of the appearance of impropriety but made
no ruling on the issue. Instead, it referred to RPC 1.7, which governs concurrent conflicts of
interest and found that Mark would not be able to provide diligent representation if he
represented his father in court. Further, the court applied RPC 3.7 and found that the exclusion of
Mark would not work a substantial hardship on Theodore. Therefore, Mark could only seve as a
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witness in the case if he were disqualified as the attorney of reord. The district court, therefore,
disqualified Mark. The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus followed thereafter.
Discussion
Justice Hardesty wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting in a three-justice panel.
The questions before the Court were (1) whether representation by the child of the parties
represents the appearance of impropriety; (2) whether a non-client has the standing to claim the
concurrent-conflict-of-interest rule (RPC 1.7); and (3) whether an attorney can be disqualified
during the pretrial phase of a proceeding because he is a potential witness.
I.

Standard for writ relief

A writ of mandamus is only granted if no plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy exists.3
The Court has previously indicated that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate way to challenge
district court orders disqualifying attorneys.4
II.

Mark’s representation of Theodore did not create a disqualifying appearance of
impropriety

Although the district court did not address the issue of the appearance of impropriety,
Marie opposed writ relief under Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted by the ABA, which states that a lawyer should avoid “even the appearance of
professional impropriety.” Marie argued that Mark could not avoid the appearance of
impropriety because he is the son of opposing litigants and is a potential future heir to the marital
estate.
The Court rejected Marie’s arguments. First, the older ABA Model’s Code has since been
replaced by the ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which expressly eliminated the
“appearance of impropriety standard.”5 Notably, Nevada adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1986 as SCR 150-203.5 and has since renumbered its own rules to track
the numbering of the ABA Rules. Further, Nevada expressly refused to adopt Canon 9 of the
Model Code.6 Instead, the Court found that the appearance of impropriety rule only applies to
public lawyers, and only if the appearance is so extreme as to undermine public trust and
confidence in the judicial system.7 That situation did not exist in the present case. Generally, a
mere appearance of impropriety does not by itself warrant a lawyer’s disqualification.8
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III.

Marie lacked standing to seek Mark’s disqualification pursuant to RPC 1.7

RPC 1.7(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if it involves a concurrent
conflict of interest, but even if a conflict arises, the lawyer can continue to represent the client if
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes he will be able to provided diligent representation to the
client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; and (3) each client gives informed consent
in writing.
Before determining whether or not Mark’s representation of his father represents a
conflict of interest, the Court first had to determine whether Marie had standing to seek
disqualification. The general rule is that only a current or former client has standing to bring
forward a motion to disqualify.9 Some courts have allowed non-clients to bring a motion to
disqualify in limited instances. First, if the breach of ethics “so infects the litigation” that it
impacts the moving party’s interest in a just and lawful determination of his or her claims, the
non-client may bring forward a motion to disqualify.10 Standing can also come from a breach of
a duty of confidentiality to the moving party, regardless of whether a lawyer-client relationship
previously existed.11
Here, Marie simply alleged that Mark’s love for his parents impacted his ability to
represent Theodore, not Marie. Marie did not argue how Mark’s representation of his father
affected her legal interest. Therefore, she did not prove that some “specifically identifiable
impropriety” occurred.12 Further Mark’s father provided informed written consent that waived
the conflict in accordance with RPC 1.7(b)(4). Because the Nevada Rules of Professional
Conduct allow an attorney to represent a family member, no ethical breach “infect[ed] the
litigation.”
In addition, Mark’s relationship with his mother did not establish a confidential
relationship.13 Although a fiduciary relationship may exist through a family relationship,14 a
family relationship by itself does not create such a relationship unless supported by additional
facts.15 Whether a parent-child fiduciary relationship exists is a matter of fact and not presumed
as a matter of law.16 In Brown, the Court found that disqualification is not warranted absent proof
of a reasonable probability the attorney acquired privileged, confidential information.17 Here,
Marie offered no evidence that Mark acquired confidential information from her.

9

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 annot.; see also Great Lakes Const., Inc. v. Burman, 114 Cal. Rptr. 301,
307 (Ct. App. 2010).
10
Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
11
DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
12
Brown, 166 Nev. at 1205, 14 P.3d at 1280.
13
See U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2nd Cir. 1991); Latty v. St. Joseph’s Society, 17 A.3d 155, 161 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2011); Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E. 2d 714, 718 (Va. 2000).
14
Perry v. Jordan, 111 Nev. 943, 947, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (1995).
15
Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985); Texas Bank and Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W. 2d 502, 508
(Tex. 1980).
16
Latty, 17 A.3d at 161; see also Dino v. Pelayo, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 624 (CT. App. 2006).
17
116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267. Other courts have similarly refused to disqualify counsel on similar grounds.
See Addam v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (CT. App. 2004); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
850-51.

Finally, Marie did not establish that Mark had a disabling “pecuniary interest” in his
couple’s estate. While children may have an expectation in acquiring their parents’ estate, no
child has a pecuniary right to his or her parent’s estate.18 Even if Marie had proven a pecuniary
interest, a pecuniary interest by itself does not create a confidential or fiduciary relationship
requiring disqualification.
IV.

Mark’s status as a potential witness during the pretrial phase did not warrant
disqualification

The Court had previously ruled that RPC 3.7 does not disqualify an attorney entirely
from the case; instead, the attorney is simply prohibited from appearing as trial counsel. 19 He or
she may still represent a client in the pretrial stage.20 Here, the district court abused its discretion
when it disqualified Mark as an attorney because the case had not reached the trial phase.
Conclusion
The Court granted the Writ of Mandamus and overturned the district court’s order. The
Court found that the district court abused its discretion when it disqualified the husband’s
attorney because he was the child of both parties.
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